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Tax Compliances in Korea and Japan: 
 Why are they so different?*
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We analyze the determinants of tax compliance, and illustrate why 
they have different levels of tax compliance between Korea and Japan.  
Japan has much higher level of policies in both tax audit and penalty 
structures than those of Korea.  The disclosure policy of tax 
information is also different, such that an amount of tax evasion and the 
information about tax return are strictly regulated in Korea, however, 
they are selectively released in Japan.  Tax culture may be one 
fundamental determinant for explaining the tax compliance.  We 
examine its endogenous characteristic.  Our estimates show that Japan 
has the higher level of tax culture than that of Korea.  We also illustrate 
that the legal system is relatively more important factor to determine 
the level of tax culture than other branches of government, which 
eventually affects the level of tax compliance.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The theory of tax compliance was pioneered by Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) within the framework of game theory.  Tax evasion was treated as a 
risky asset, which is usually determined by tax audit and penalty rate.  The 
tax compliance behavior has been popularly explained by the punishment 
oriented policies, like tax audit and penalty rate (for example, Alm, Bahl, and 
Murray, 1993; Alm, McClelland, and Schulze, 1992; Fisher, Wartick, and 
Mark, 1992).  However, a game theoretical approach could not completely 
explain the tax compliance behavior.  There have been many studies to 
explain the behavior of tax compliance in more realistic situations.1)  Their 
focuses have been on the determinants of tax compliance with economic and 
noneconomic factors.  Noneconomic factors, which had been neglected by 
economists, have been popularly introduced to explain tax compliance by 
using the economic framework (for example, Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 
1993; Alm, Sanchez, and DeJuan, 1995; Falkinger and Walther, 1991; Nagin, 
1990; Smith and Stalans, 1991).  They have tried to include many 
noneconomic factors which are, for example, the willingness to pay for 
public provision, public education, tax morale, and etc.  Many empirical 
studies have been done with this line of the theoretical argument, especially 
with the development of the experimental data in the research of tax 
compliance.2)
The concept of tax culture has been much discussed to explain the 
difference of tax compliance behaviors in many countries.3)  Tax culture, 
which is also differently expressed as tax morale, was broadly defined, so 
that the behavior of tax compliance was furthermore explained as the 
traditional approaches have some limitation to fully explain the behavior of 
                                                          
1) See Alm (1999), Andreoni and Feinstein (1998), Slemrod (1992) for the comprehensive 
survey of tax compliance. 
2) The use of experimental data has been popular in the research of tax compliance with the 
development of experimental economics.  See Davis and Holt (1993) for the application of 
experimental economics. 
3) Nerre (2001) shows a broad definition of tax culture with historical backgrounds for each 
country. 
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tax compliance.  A comparative analysis for tax compliance might be one 
approach to explain the effect of tax culture on tax compliance (for example, 
Cunnings, Martinez-Vazquez, and McKee, 2001; Torgler, 2004). 
Tax evasion has been one of the hot topics in tax administration of Korea.  
There are several studies to estimate its serious situations of tax evasion, for 
example, by Hyun and Yoo (1998), Schneider and Klinglmair (2004).  Japan 
is a developed country which has much similar historical backgrounds with 
Korea.  However, its level of tax evasion was evaluated to be much lower 
than that of Korea.  Identifying the reason why two countries have such 
different levels of tax compliance might be an interesting area for research, 
as tax compliance can be explained by many factors including tax system and 
tax culture.  However, the comparative study of tax compliance, especially 
for Korea and Japan, has not been analyzed so far, even though there are 
several studies to estimate the determinants of tax compliance for each 
country respectively.4)  The research framework in the field of tax 
compliance can be easily applied to these two countries to more 
systematically explain the behavior of tax compliance. 
The purpose of this study is to empirically find the determinents of tax 
compliance in Korea as well as Japan and to illustrate why these two 
countries have different levels of tax compliance.  We review the differences 
in the punishment policies with tax audit and penalty structure, for protecting 
tax evasion between the two countries.  We also discuss their differences in 
non-economic factors.  Furthermore, we estimate the determinants of tax 
culture by pooling the dataset of Korea and Japan from the World Value 
Survey. 
This paper has the following structure:  section 2 explains the differences 
in policies of economic and non-economic factors between Korea and Japan.  
Section 3 discusses the importance of tax culture in tax compliance, and 
explains the determinants of tax culture for Korea and Japan.  Lastly, section 
4 concludes. 
 
                                                          
4) One example is Park and Hyun (2003) for the case of Korea. 
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2. POLICIES FOR TAX COMPLIANCE 
 
In this section, we review the existing literatures on the measurement of 
tax compliance for Korea and Japan.  We also compare the policies with an 
aim to protect the tax compliance behavior between the two countries.  They 
include three economic factors, and one non-economic factor for this 
comparison. 
 
2.1. The Measurement of Tax Compliance 
 
As our concern for study is about the difference of tax compliances 
between the two countries, we need to get the exact estimates for the levels 
of tax compliance of Korea and Japan respectively.  There has been no 
empirical evidence to directly estimate the sizes of tax evasion for the two 
countries together.  There are several empirical studies to estimate the level 
of tax evasion for each country separately.  For example, Hyun and Yoo 
(1998) shows the empirical results for the levels of tax evasion for several 
countries, including Korea but not Japan.5)  One of the main reasons that 
there has been no empirical evidence for the case of Japan is that the use of 
micro-level data for income and expenditure has not been allowed by the 
Japanese government.6)
We use some estimates of the black economy for a comparative analysis as 
a proxy measurement.  One of the most comprehensive surveys about the 
size of the shadow economy, which was done by Schneider and Klinglmair 
(2004), shows the estimates of the size of the shadow economy with respect 
to GDP for the world.  The size of the shadow economy might include all 
levels of tax evasion in all tax subjects.  As our study discusses tax evasion in 
the income taxes, the level of tax evasion for our concern would be some 
                                                          
5) Hyun and Yoo (1998) applied the same methodology into the ten countries by using 
Luxemboug Income Study database.  For Korea, the self-employed underreport their real 
income by 25% of the reported income.  Germany showed much lower level, and the countries 
in transition show comparatively much higher levels.  
6) There is a few study to estimate the size of the black economy.  However, its analysis was 
based on time series data, not on micro-level data for each individual or a household. 
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Table 1  Comparison of Shadow Economies between the Two Countries 
Country Shadow Economy / GDP 
Korea 
Japan 
27.5 
11.3 
Source: Schneider and Klinglmair (2004).  The numbers are average values for 2000 and 2001. 
 
proportion of these estimates of the total shadow economy.  However, as the 
difference in the size of the shadow economy between the two countries 
reaches almost 16% of GDP, we assume that Korea has more tax evasion for 
all tax subjects.  These estimates show the aggregated summary for tax 
evasions, however, do not indicate the level of tax evasion for each taxpayer.  
Korea has much higher proportion of self-employed group with respect to the 
total employment than that of Japan.  It is so difficult to insist that the self-
employed group in Korea has higher evasion than that of Japan, with just 
comparison of aggregate estimates of the shadow economy.  However, as 
Korea has been much different from Japan in the total size of the shadow 
economy by 16% of GDP, it might not be too much exaggeration to assume 
that each taxpayer with evasion in Korea has a higher level of evasion than 
Japan. 
We use these estimates as proxy measurements to indicate the levels of tax 
compliance between Korea and Japan.  Korea and Japan have the size of 
27.5% and 11.3% separately by their estimates of an average value for 2000 
and 2001.  Korea has more than twice the size of the shadow economy with 
respect to GDP than that of Japan.  We interpret that Korea has a higher level 
of tax evasion than Japan. 
 
2.2. Tax Audit 
 
Tax audit is one of the most effective policies to protect the tax evasion 
behavior.  The level of tax audit can be determined by two elements; one 
is how many taxpayers are selected for audit, and the other is how much 
Jin Kwon Hyun 140 
Table 2  Comparison of the Ratios of Selected Taxpayers for Audit 
(unit: %) 
Individual Income Tax Corporate Income Tax 
Year 
Korea Japan Korea Japan 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
0.26 
0.39 
0.34 
0.22 
1.24 
0.99 
1.03 
1.02 
1.83 
1.76 
1.86 
1.43 
4.96 
4.33 
4.21 
3.94 
Note: Number of selected taxpayers for audit / Total number of taxpayers with tax return. 
Source: author’s calculation. 
 
intensive the audit is.  The first element is easily measured by the number of 
audited taxpayers divided by the total number of taxpayers.  However, the 
latter is so difficult to measure due to non-published information about tax 
audit process.  It is commonly measured by the first element to indicate the 
level of tax audit for practical comparison.   
Tax audit needs the administrative cost.  With the constraint of the fixed 
administration cost, an increase in the level of tax audit is required to 
decrease the level of other administrative functions, like taxpayer service, tax 
collection, etc.  As our concern is about the relationship between tax audit 
and tax evasion, we do not consider the change in other tax services by the 
change of tax audit that tax authorities respond.   
We compare the level of tax audit for the two countries.  Table 2 shows the 
ratio of the number of taxpayers for audit with respect to the total number of 
taxpayers with tax return filing for each year.  Korea shows much lower 
ratios in both the individual income tax and the corporate income tax than 
those in Japan over times.  Especially, Japan has almost three times higher 
value in the ratio of selected taxpayers for audit than that in Korea.  We find 
that there exists a dramatic difference in the levels of tax audit between 
Korea and Japan. 
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2.3. Penalty 
 
The structure of penalty system is so different between Korea and Japan, 
so that it is hard to directly compare it.  One feature is that Korea has various 
types of penalty rate by the different tax subjects, however, Japan has the 
different structure of penalty rate by the types of taxpayer.  In Korea, penalty 
rate has been separately applied by the different tax subjects like the 
individual income tax, capital income tax, value added tax, etc.  Furthermore, 
the penalty rate for each tax subject are differentiated by the different types 
of evasion, like non-filing, timely filing but under-reporting, no bookkeeping, 
no receipts, etc.  Thus they are so complicated to explain the general features 
of penalty structures of Korea. 
In Japan, penalty structures are comparatively simpler than that of Korea.  
One feature in Japan is that the penalty rate is differently applied to the types 
of taxpayers, depending upon their evasion behaviors.  If some taxpayers had 
intentional evasions, the penalty rate is much higher than that of 
unintentional evasions. 
Table 3 shows the comparison of penalty rate for the several cases between 
the two countries.  As two kinds of evasion behavior are most common in tax 
compliance, which are timely filing but underreporting, and nonfiling, we 
compare the penalty rate for these two cases.  Even though Korea has the 
different penalty rate for each different tax subject, we compare the two tax 
subjects of the individual income tax and the capital gain tax for the case of 
 
Table 3  Penalty Structures in Korea and Japan 
Korea Japan 
 
 Individual 
Income Tax
Capital Gain 
Tax 
Evasion without 
Intention 
Evasion with 
Intention 
Timely Filing, 
but Under-
reporting 
Almost 10% Almost 18% 10% or 15% 35% 
Non-filing 20% 10% 15% 40% 
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Table 4  Number of Prosecuted Cases for Tax Evaders (2003) 
Korea Japan 
164 147 
 
individual taxpayer.  In general, we find that Korea has a higher level of 
penalty for evasion without intention than that in Japan.  However, Japan has 
much higher level of penalty rate for intentional evasion than that in Korea.  
Both countries have the same system that tax authorities prosecute some 
intentional and malicious tax evaders for criminal responsibility, after tax 
audit.  This system might play an important role in increasing the level of 
penalty rate for the tax evasion behavior.  The number of prosecuted cases by 
tax authorities might be a proxy indicator to compare an additional penalty 
rate between the two countries.  Table 4 shows the comparisons of the number 
of prosecuted cases in 2003.  Korea and Japan have the cases of 164 and 147 
separately.  As the number of total taxpayers in Japan is higher, it can be 
interpreted that Korea might have the higher rate to prosecute some 
malicious and intentional tax evaders than that in Japan.  With the 
combination of penalty structure and criminal prosecution system, we may 
insist that Japan has higher level of penalty rate for the case of individual 
taxpayer with intentional and malicious evasion.   
 
2.4. Tax Rate 
 
There has been contradictory empirical evidences on the effect of tax rate 
on the level of tax compliance.  Thus it is so difficult to discuss the impact of 
tax rates on the level of tax compliance for a comparative analysis of this 
study.  We just compare the statutory tax rates between the two countries, to 
find how much difference they have for each tax subject.  Table 5 shows the 
comparison of the statutory tax rates for both the individual income tax and 
the corporate income tax.  
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Table 5  Comparisons of Statutory Tax Rates between Two Countries 
(unit: %) 
Tax Subject Korea Japan 
Individual Income Tax 
Corporate Income Tax 
9, 18, 27, 36 
15, 27 
10, 20, 30, 37 
22, 30 
 
For the individual income tax, the two countries have the similar structures 
in the statutory tax rate with the four multiple rates and their values of 
progressive system.  Japan has a little higher rate than that of Korea in 
general.   For the corporate income tax, Japan has a slightly higher rate, but 
the same with two brackets, than that of Korea.  We find that two countries 
have almost a homogeneous structure in the statutory tax rates, however, 
Japan has a little higher tax rate in both the individual income tax and the 
corporate income tax rather than those in Korea.  We can assume that the 
effect of tax rate on the level of tax compliance is negligible, as there is a 
little difference in the tax rates between the two countries.  
 
2.5. Non-economic Factor for Compliance: information disclosure 
 
There are many non-economic factors to affect the level of tax compliance.  
Many researches have been done to include these non-economic factors to 
explain tax compliance behavior under the framework of economic analysis 
(for example, Alm, Jackson, and McKee, 1993; Alm, Sanchez, and DeJuan, 
1995; Park and Hyun, 2003).  These non-economic factors include the 
willingness to pay for public provision, pubic education, tax morale, tax 
information, and etc.  As there are some limitations to include all non-
economic factors for the analysis of tax compliance behavior, most studies 
pay attention to just one or several factors for rigorous analysis.  Even though 
we understand that non-economic factors are the important determinants for 
the level of tax compliance, it is hard to compare these non-economic factors 
between Korea and Japan, due to limited information.  We just focus on one 
non-economic factor to partly explain the difference of the levels of tax 
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Table 6  Comparison of Disclosure Policy in Tax Information 
 Korea Japan 
Statistics for Evaded 
Amounts No Yes 
Information for 
Individual Taxpayer No 
Yes 
(for some income groups) 
 
compliance between them, which is the policy of tax information disclosure. 
The release of tax information might be one important determinant for tax 
compliance, as it gives taxpayers an exact figure about tax evasion.  However, 
there is few empirical evidence whether or not the release of tax information 
has an effect on the level of tax compliance.  Most of developed countries 
release much tax information for taxpayers’s right to know, not for inducing 
more tax compliance of taxpayers.  For discussing the tax information 
disclosure, we conceptually divide the tax information into the two 
components.  One is the tax statistics, and the other is the tax return 
information for each taxpayer.  There are so many types of information in tax 
statistics.  One of the most important statistics for the purpose of increasing 
the level of tax compliance is the exact amounts of tax evasion.  The other 
information is the tax return information for each taxpayer.  There are some 
exceptional countries, like Finland and Norway, which make the tax return 
information for each taxpayer public.  However, in most developed 
economies, the tax return information for each taxpayer is strictly prohibited 
to release to the public for the protection of private information.  The 
statistics about tax evasion has been popularly released to the public for most 
developed countries.  This information disclosure might be not only for 
taxpayers’ rights to know, but also for inducing more tax compliance. 
Table 6 shows the comparison of policies about the tax information 
disclosure between the two countries.  In Korea, there has been no formal 
information about the size of tax evasion after tax audit by tax authorities.  
Furthermore, the tax return information for each taxpayer has been strictly 
restricted to public release.  However, Japan shows completely different 
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patterns in the information disclosure policy.  The average amounts of tax 
evasion for the individual and the corporate evaders after tax audit have been 
released to the public.7)  Furthermore, some private information for the richest 
group of individuals and corporations have been released to the public 
under the legal basis.  There are three tax subjects under this public 
notification system, which are individual income tax, corporate income tax, 
and inheritance tax.8)  For the individual income tax, taxpayers who pay 
more than 10 million Yen for their tax payment have been notified to the 
pubic with their names, addresses, and tax amounts.  This highest income 
group amounts to around 0.11% of total taxpayers who filed the tax returns in 
2002.  For the corporate income tax, corporations who have more than 20 
million Yen for their incomes have been notified to the public with their 
names, representative persons, accounting periods, and their incomes.  These 
corporations account for around 4.2% of total corporations in 2002.  For 
inheritance tax, when the amounts of taxable value of properties for 
inheritance are over 200 million Yen or total amounts of decedent’s 
properties are over 500 million Yen, their names and the values of properties 
are notified to the public.  We find that Japan has much more active policies 
for the tax information public release than that in Korea.   
 
 
3. TAX CULTURE AND TAX COMPLIANCE 
 
Most economic analyses have concentrated on the policy tools for 
punishment, as they are easy to handle with the quantified approach.  
However, there are so many other determinants of tax compliance for 
                                                          
7) For example, an average income declared in 2002 individual income tax return was 5.5 
million Yen, and unreported income after tax audit averaged 6.8 million Yen per case.  For 
corporation, an average declared income was 41.68 million Yen, and an average unreported 
income was 12.79 million Yen in 2002. 
8) The public notification system has been playing an important role in checking taxpayers 
with the public since 1950 when introduced for the first time. This system has been 
occasionally utilized for the purpose other than the original ones, posing a concern about 
possible disturbance of privacy.  Currently, this system has the legal base with Income tax law 
Article 233, Corporation tax law Article 152, Inheritance tax law Article 49(1) and 49(2). 
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taxpayers.9)  It is so difficult to explain all factors in the determinants of tax 
compliance.  We have compared several factors to explain the difference of 
tax compliances between the two countries.  However, our analysis so far just 
partially explain the difference of tax compliances between the two countries.  
We use the concept of tax culture to explain the difference in tax compliance, 
in addition to the several factors that we have discussed so far.  Tax culture is 
not conceptually organized well yet, so that it has the different expressions 
like tax morale, social capital stock, etc.10)  We define, here in this paper, that 
tax culture is all residual factors that have not been considered to explain the 
behavior of tax compliance for this study.  
 
3.1. Difference in Tax Culture 
 
Tax culture is very difficult to measure, as it includes various attributes.  
We use the World Value Survey data for a comparative analysis between 
Korea and Japan.  The World Value Survey is a worldwide investigation of 
socio-cultural and political changes, which includes the cases of Korea as 
well as Japan.  There are so many variables for this dataset.  One of them is 
about the attitudes toward cheating on taxation, which can be an indirect 
proxy for measuring the level of tax culture for each country.  This attitude 
was measured on the 10 different scales, where the value of one indicates that 
cheating on taxation is never justifiable and the value of ten means it is 
always justifiable.  This dataset has been regularly surveyed,11) and the 
most 
                                                          
9) One study by IRS in US shows there are around 60 factors for the determinants of tax 
compliance.  
10) One popular definition of tax culture has been done by Nerre (2001) as follows:  
“A country-specific tax culture is the entirety of all relevant formal and informal institutions 
connected with the national tax system and its practical execution, which are historically 
embedded within the country’s culture, including the dependencies and ties resulting from 
their ongoing interaction.” 
11) The first one was carried out in 1981 for European Value Survey.  The second wave was 
completed in 1990-1991 designed for global use.  The third one was carried out in 1995-1996, 
and the fourth one made in 1999-2001.  As the third one is the most recent one which can be 
accessed by the public, we use the third wave for analysis. 
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Table 7  Attitude Difference toward Cheating on Taxes 
 Korea (1996) Japan (1995) 
Never Justifiable (%) 71.3 80.6 
Average Value for Scale 2.10 1.52 
Note: Attitude scale ranges from 1 to 10, and the value of 1 means that cheating on taxes is 
never justifiable.  The sample sizes are 1,499 and 1,478 for Korea and Japan separately. 
 
recent ones for public use are the 1996 one for Korea and the 1995 one for 
Japan. 
Table 7 shows the frequency of response for “tax cheating is never 
justifiable” with respect to the total respondents and the average value for 
scaled response.  Korea shows a lower proportion of never justifiable 
response than that of Japan.  It also shows the consistent feature that the 
average value for response in Korea is higher than that in Japan.  We find that 
Japan has the higher value in tax culture than that in Korea. 
 
3.2. The Determinants of Tax Culture 
 
Next question for analysis is why Korea has a lower level of tax culture 
than that of Japan.  We need to estimate the determinants of tax culture to 
answer this question.12)  Our hypothesis is that tax culture is influenced by 
the public attitude toward the government in a broad sense, which includes 
executive, legislative, and legal branches.  If people distrust the government, 
they would cheat the taxation easily.  However, they will comply more 
voluntarily with more trust toward the government.  We choose three factors 
for the independent variables which determine the level of tax culture, which 
are the legal system, the national government, and the parliament.  We 
assume that the attitudes for these three kinds of the government jointly 
                                                          
12) Torgler (2004) shows the first empirical evidence for the determinants of tax culture by 
using the same dataset of World Value Survey.  We closely follow the basic structure of his 
work, however, focusing on the cases of Korea and Japan. 
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Table 8   Frequencies of Positive Attitude for National System between 
the Two Countries 
(unit: %) 
Variables Korea Japan 
Legal System 
much confident 
confident 
National Government 
much confident 
confident 
Parliament 
much confident 
confident 
 
8.8 
49.7 
 
4.8 
39.1 
 
3.3 
27.7 
 
15.8 
63.8 
 
2.1 
28.2 
 
1.7 
23.2 
 
determine the level of tax culture for both countries.  These attitudes for the 
independent variables were measured with four different scales, where the 
value of one means the highest confidence, and the value of four means the 
least confidence.  Thus less value indicates more confidence for each branch 
of the government.   
Table 8 shows the comparison of these responses toward each branch for 
Korea and Japan, by the frequency of the response with positive attitude.  For 
the legal system, Japan shows the higher frequency than that of Korea.  
However, Korea shows the higher frequency for the trust toward the national 
government.  For the parliament, Korea shows slightly higher value than 
Japan.   
We estimate the relationship between the level of tax culture and the 
attitudes toward three government branches, by using the weighted least 
squares.  As we assume that the level of tax culture is jointly determined by 
the attitudes toward three branches of the government, we pool the dataset of 
Korea and Japan together to measure the effect of each independent variable 
on the level of tax culture.  Furthermore, we include employment status as 
one explanatory variable for the determinant of tax culture.  As discussed 
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Table 9   Regression Results for the Determinants of Tax Culture 
Independent Variables Korea and Japan Korea Japan 
Legal System 
0.209 
(0.152) 
0.245 
(0.314) 
0.182 
(0.020) 
National Government 
–0.074 
(0.662) 
–0.165 
(0.548) 
0.079 
(0.430) 
Parliament 
0.016 
(0.918) 
0.030 
(0.899) 
–0.058 
(0.574) 
Employment Status 
(self-employed = 1) 
0.372 
(0.104) 
0.369 
(0.309) 
0.374 
(0.005) 
Country Dummy 
(Japan = 1) 
–0.444 
(0.026) 
N/A N/A 
F value 
2.983 
(0.011) 
0.537 
(0.708) 
3.701 
(0.005) 
Sample Size 2,170 1,246 923 
Note: Dependent variable is the response for tax cheating, where lower numbers mean more 
negative attitude on tax cheating.  The value in parenthesis indicates the significance 
level. 
 
earlier, the self-employed group has much more tax evasion than salaried 
employees.  It is generally assumed that the self-employed group might have 
the lower level of tax culture than that of salaried employees.  We use a 
regression model to estimate these relationships. 
Table 9 shows the empirical results for three different regressions.  The 
first column with the pooled data of Korea and Japan indicates that the 
attitudes toward the national government and the parliament do not influence 
the level of tax culture as their estimates have the statistically insignificant 
levels.  However, the legal system has the influence on the level of tax 
culture in a relatively more significant level.  The self-employed group has 
the lower level of tax culture than salaried employees.  The dummy variable 
indicating the difference in the level of tax culture in Japan shows the 
negative value in a statistically significant level.  It implies that Japan has the 
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higher level in tax culture than that of Korea.  
It might be possible for Korea and Japan to have different characteristics in 
determining the level of tax culture with three branches of the government.  
For this purpose, we separately estimate the determinants of tax culture for 
each country.  For Korea, all three branches of the government do not 
determine the level of tax culture, as their estimates are so statistically 
insignificant.  Furthermore, the impact of the self-employed group on the 
level of tax culture is so weak, which implies that there is no difference in the 
levels of tax culture between the self-employed and salaried employees.  
Consequently, our model does not explain the determinants of tax culture in 
Korea, as it shows the insignificant level of F values.   
However, Japan has the different feature, as third column shows.  The 
legal system has the relatively much more influence on the level of tax 
culture in Japan.  It indicates that when Japanese have more trust toward the 
legal system, they have a higher level of tax culture.  Furthermore, the self-
employed group shows the lower level of tax culture at a highly significant 
level.  This model explains the determinants of tax culture in a case of Japan, 
in a statistically significant level.  
We draw relatively weak empirical evidence for the determinants of tax 
culture from our analysis.  However, we illustrate that Japan has a higher 
level of tax culture than that of Korea, from the model of the determinants of 
tax culture.  Definitely, it needs further empirical analysis to explain the 
determinants of tax culture in a comparative analysis.  Korea needs much 
more careful analysis to find the determinants of tax culture to explain the tax 
compliance behavior. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Korea and Japan have a close geographical location, and similar historical 
backgrounds with each other.  However, Korea was evaluated to have much 
lower level of tax compliance than that of Japan.  We analyze the 
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determinants of tax compliance, and illustrate why they have different levels 
of tax compliance between Korea and Japan.  We explain the tax compliance 
behavior by using three different factors, which are economic and non-
economic factors, and tax culture. 
For the economic factors, Japan has much higher level of policies in both 
tax audit and penalty structures than those of Korea.  We compare the 
disclosure policy of tax information to explain the effect of non-economic 
factors with each other.  Tax information about the amounts of tax evasion 
and taxpayers’ return are completely kept back from the public in Korea.  
However, Japan on a regular base publishes an average amount of tax 
evasion after tax audit to the public, and releases the information of 
taxpayers’ return for an extremely high income group.  
Tax culture is broadly defined to include the residual factors for explaining 
the determinants of tax compliance.  We use the World Value Survey dataset 
for our empirical estimates.  Korea has the lower level of tax culture by 
measuring the attitude toward cheating taxes than that of Japan.  We assume 
that tax culture is determined by the attitudes of taxpayers toward the 
government in general with three branches of the legal system, the national 
government, and the parliament.  Our estimates are based on pooling the 
dataset of Korea and Japan, and show that Japan has the higher level of tax 
culture than that of Korea.  They also show that the legal system is relatively 
more important factor to determine the level of tax compliance.  The other 
organizations do not show the statistically significant results for estimates.  
By analyzing the same model of tax culture for each country separately, we 
illustrate that the legal system is influential for the determinants of tax culture 
in Japan, at a statistically significant level.  However, Korea has different 
features that all three organizations do not have effect on determination of the 
level of tax culture.  We suggest that Korea needs more rigorous analysis to 
evaluate the determinants of tax culture for the study of tax compliance. 
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